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Before the 17th Amendment went into effect in 1914, the election of United States 
senators by state legislatures was one of the most prominent features of American national 
politics.  As important as these elections were, there has been surprisingly little direct analysis of 
U.S. Senate elections before direct election.  George Haynes’s 1906 Progressive Era monograph 
is now a century old.  Riker’s classic 1955 article on the role of the Senate in American 
federalism is nearly half a century old and, in any case, delved very little into the direct evidence 
of how Senate elections were conducted.  The past decade has seen a number of articles examine 
the consequences of switching from state legislative election to direct election of senators in the 
1910s, but the pre-17th Amendment politics in those paper is taken as given, not the focus of 
analysis (Stewart 1992a, 1992b; King and Ellis 1996; Hibbing and Brandes Crook 1997; Wirls 
1998). 
This paper is part of a larger project that seeks to remedy our lack of accurate 
understanding about Senate elections before 1913.  In this work, we examine two small but 
important slices of those politics, which are (1) the link between the mass state electorates and 
the state legislators in determining who would be elected to the Senate and (2) the role of 
political parties in electing senators.  The core of the evidence consists of narratives about two 
states, New York and Florida, which varied considerably in the strength of formal party 
organizations.  The episodes we explore are times when the choice of senator was thrown into 
the “joint convention” of both legislative chambers, because the two chambers separately could 
not elect a senator.  For Florida, we examine the protracted Senate elections of 1873, 1875, 1887, 
and 1891.  For New York, we examine 1881, 1887, and 1911 in detail.  This is an exploratory 
paper, and our intent is to delve into these cases in order to generate new systematic and testable 
hypotheses about Senate election politics during this period. 
We reach two general conclusions based on the Florida and New York cases.  The first is 
that the links between the mass electorate and state legislators in Senate elections was highly 
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variable.  While it is true that the party controlling the state legislature ended up controlling the 
election of the U.S. senator virtually all of the time from 1871 to 1913, the state legislative 
election rarely settled anything more than the party of the senator.  Senate candidates were rarely 
known definitively on Election Day.  Senate candidates would emerge after the fall general 
election, which is when they would seek support from state legislators, and then subject 
themselves to party caucuses and formal votes in the legislature.  Consequently, prognostications 
about the outcome of the subsequent U.S. Senate election made after state legislative elections 
were often wrong.   
The second general conclusion is that the role of political party leaders—“bosses”—was 
also highly variable.  Party machine leaders were certainly critical, but even the “big boss” could 
lose.  Rival factions might test the strength of top leaders.  Short-term electoral setbacks might 
provide openings for insurgent elements within a party.  Minority party legislators always had 
incentives to exploit divisions within the majority party.  To state that party bosses were the most 
important influences on the outcomes of Senate elections is not to say that they were the only 
influences or even determinative. 
 The paper is divided into three sections. First, we present data on the number of elections 
and joint session ballots for 11 states from 1871-1913.  Second, we present a detailed case of a 
state that had high party competition but few joint session ballots (New York) to illustrate how 
party organizations sought to control the nomination (through party caucus balloting) and 
election of U.S. senators.  Moreover, because there we have a  complete data set with party 
affiliation and vote choice for all the legislators for New York (not available for all states during 
this time period), we are able to relate party electoral strength to party cohesion and loyalty in the 
selection process for U.S. senator.  Third, we present a different case (Florida) where one party 
dominated the state legislature, but was highly factionalized and suffered a number of extended 
joint ballot sessions in Senate elections.  Specifically, we focus on the extent to which individual 
legislators shifted their votes from one candidate to another over the course of extended 
balloting, explaining those shifts in terms of coalitional change within majority parties.   
 
The Data 
 This paper is part of a larger project in which we are examining Senate elections in all 
states from 1871 to 1913.  To begin the project, we randomly chose 11 states:  Alabama, 
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California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and 
North Carolina.  It is our intention to use what we learn from this random sample of states to 
guide research that will involve data from all 48 states that were in the Union during this period. 
 For the eleven states in our sample, we gathered as much relevant information as we 
could about the balloting for Senate in each state.  This includes: 
• The actual roll call votes for senators.  This has resulted in a data set with around 200,000 
observations across all states and Senate elections. 
• The district and the political party of each state legislator voting for senator, where 
available.1 
• Election return information for each state legislator. 
 The legislative journals are available for all the states in our sample, so we have a 
complete record of voting for senators during this period.2  Official information from the states, 
in the form of “Red Books,” research reports, and information in legislative journals, plus 
newspaper accounts, makes the identity of the district and political party membership of all these 
legislators nearly complete.  Election return information is fugitive, ranging from New York 
(where it is practically complete), to Massachusetts (where it is mostly complete for the time 
period), to Maine (where it is complete for the Senate but not the House), to Kentucky (where no 
collection of legislative election returns survives for this period). 
Along with the quantitative information, we are gathering accounts of Senate elections.  
Most states, particularly New York, have been subject to political histories in which Senate 
elections loom large.  The Tribune Almanac regularly contained a narrative synopsis of each 
Senate election through the 1890s, as did entries in Appleton’s Annual Cyclopaedia.  Finally, we 
are collecting newspaper accounts for Senate elections.  For this, the online historical archive of 
the New York Times is invaluable, but we have also collected accounts from other newspapers 
that have been microfilmed, in the states where the Senate elections were held. 
                                                 
1 For example, North Carolina has no existing compilation of the party affiliation of legislators who served in the 
state House and Senate for this time period. 
2 There are several excellent collections of state legislative journals throughout the United States—some that are 
more comprehensive than the official state repositories of the “home” states.  Among these collections are the 
Library of Congress, New York Public Library, New York State Library, and Yale University Law Library.  For the 
other information in the data set, we have relied on official sources, plus unpublished information provided by 
helpful archivists and librarian in virtually all the states in our sample. 
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For this paper, we have focused our attention on multiple ballot elections to the Senate 
from New York and Florida from 1871 to 1913.  These elections were governed by the federal 
law passed in 1866, in response to controversies that arose in Senate elections prior to the Civil 
War.3  The framework enunciated in the 1866 act provided for a two-step process.  As had been 
typical before 1866, each chamber was to meet separately at noon on the second Tuesday after 
the state legislature had organized, to vote separately for senator.  On the following day at noon, 
the two chambers would meet in joint session to canvass the votes.  If a majority of members of 
each chamber favored the same candidate, he would be declared elected.  If not, then the “joint 
convention” of legislators from both chambers would ballot, a majority being required for 
election.  If no majority resulted, the joint convention was required to ballot at least once a day 
until a senator was chosen. 
The elections we have chosen to study could not be resolved through simple majorities in 
both chambers.  Therefore, the types of elections we focus on in this paper are not typical, in the 
sense that they were more conflictual than average in the process of legislative balloting.  We 
make no claim for representativeness.  However, we do claim that these conflictual elections are 
useful to examine in an early phase of a research project because they lay bare political dynamics 
that may be hidden, for instance, under periods of unified party control of state legislatures. 
Extended battles in state legislatures over choosing a U.S. senator occurred for two major 
reasons.  First, both chambers might be controlled by different parties.  In that case, if the joint 
convention were controlled by one of the parties, then the joint convention would simply ballot 
once and elect the senatorial candidate preferred by the political party with a majority in the joint 
convention.  This is by far the most common outcome of split-control cases, though in our 
previous research (Schiller and Stewart 2004), we analyzed the case of Kentucky in 1896 and 
1897, in which the joint convention was effectively tied for two years straight.  Second, either or 
both chambers might be experiencing factional conflict within the majority party.  In that case, 
the typical pattern was for the factional conflict to spill over into the joint convention, yielding a 
protracted ballot for Senate.4   
                                                 
3See Haynes 1906, chapter 2, for the background on why the law was adopted.  The law may be found at U.S. 
Statutes at Large, vol. 14, pp. 243-44. 
4 Previously we discovered that 31% of all Senate elections in our data set from 1871 to 1913 were resolved in joint 
convention, 38% before 1901 and 17% afterwards (Schiller and Stewart 2004, pp. 5-6).  Of the elections that went to 
joint ballot, 41% were resolved on the first ballot. 
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Table 1 reports the joint convention elections for Senate in the eleven states in our data 
set between 1871 and 1913.  Further investigation into these states reveals that various “joint 
convention profiles” existed among the states in our sample.  Two states, Iowa and Maine, were 
essentially one-party states during this period, controlled by a single party that was also cohesive.  
Neither ever had a joint convention during these years.  From our preliminary examination of 
these cases, Iowa and Maine ended up having important differences in how their Senate elections 
typically proceeded.  In Iowa there often was a small protest vote against the dominant 
Republican faction and a robust enough Democratic Party that the insurgent Republicans could 
have conceivably broken away to elect a senator in league with the Democrats.  However, the 
protest vote appears to have been managed to avoid this eventuality.  We have discovered no 
strong factional vote among Republicans in Maine Senate elections, once the process got to the 
legislature.  The unusual thing about Maine is that it appears that the minority Democrats often 
abstained in the Senate election votes.   
At the other extreme were Kentucky and Massachusetts, each of which had seven joint 
conventions across a series of sixteen Senate elections.  Yet in each case, the source of the joint 
conventions was quite different.  With the exception of the 1896-1897 standoff in Kentucky, the 
Blue Grass State’s joint conventions arose from factionalism within the Democratic party which 
typically took two-to-three weeks to resolve.  In Massachusetts, on the other hand, joint 
conventions arose from close partisan divisions in the legislature that prohibited a single 
candidate from getting a majority in the two chambers.  In most cases, the convening of a joint 
convention created a single majority party in an artificially constituted unicameral legislature, 
which then selected the candidate from the joint convention’s majority party. 
 
The Case of New York 
New York is a case of a state that was highly competitive, whose state politics was 
dominated by party machines for the entire period covered in this paper.  It is exceptional in one 
important way that makes it an ideal starting point for examining Senate elections in state 
legislatures:  the amount of data relevant for studying these elections is considerable.  Unique 
among the states in our sample, we have uninterrupted electoral data and reliable information 
about party membership of state legislators for the entire period. Qualitatively, New York 
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politics during this period has been well covered by contemporary newspapers, books, and 
memoirs.5
  Between 1871 and 1912, Republicans and Democrats fought bitterly for control over 
New York politics.  This competition was embedded in national politics, with New York pivotal 
in presidential races.  Republicans carried New York in seven presidential elections from 1872 to 
1912, Democrats carried it four times.  Because New York was America’s financial and 
industrial capital, the state’s politicians and financial supporters were even more important in 
national councils than the Empire State’s large number of up-for-grabs electoral votes already 
warranted.  The pivotal status of New York in national politics was reflected in the claim that 
New York had in both parties on either the presidential or vice presidential nomination 
throughout this period.  The close partisan balance was also characteristic of the major statewide 
race, governor.  In the 21 gubernatorial elections from 1870 to 1912, Democrats prevailed 11 
times, Republicans 10 times. 
With this intense partisan competition, one would suspect that control of the New York 
State Legislature would have been regularly up for grabs.  Yet this suspicion would be wrong.  
Throughout this period, the Republicans regularly controlled both chambers of the state 
legislature.  In the 43 legislative sessions from 1871 to 1913, Republicans held a majority in the 
Senate 35 times, a majority in the House 34 times, and a majority of the “joint ballot” 35 times. 
This virtually impenetrable dominance of the Republican Party over the New York 
legislature gave the Republican Party a boost in electing senators for these four decades.  From 
the 1870s until the onset of popular election in New York in 1914, U.S. Senate seats came open 
14 times and were filled with Republicans ten times.  The only lucky break the Democrats 
caught was in the elections of 1891 and 1893.  In those years, the cycle of New York Senate 
seats corresponded with a brief moment in which Democrats controlled the state legislature.  
  The most important thing to know about Senate elections in New York from 1871 to 
1913 is that control over the selection of a U.S. senator went to the party that controlled the 
legislature.  That party was typically the Republicans, who controlled the legislature much more 
                                                 
5 Chief among these are the definitive political history by Alexander (1909, 1923), Brown and Smith’s political 
history of New York (1922), Thomas C. Platt’s autobiography (1910), Harold Gosnell’s monograph on Platt’s 
activities are party boss (1924), and other works (Chessman 1965; Flick 1935; McGuire 1905; Mushkat 1981).  
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often than their support in the electorate warranted, because of a substantial bias that favored the 
Republicans in legislative apportionment.6  
However, as we showed previously, control of a state legislature by a single political 
party was neither necessary nor sufficient for the majority party to smoothly control the selection 
of the actual winner (Schiller and Stewart 2004).  Yet in the specific case of New York, there 
never was a case in this period when the party with a numerical advantage failed to elect a 
senator.  There were occasionally threats that the minority party might join with an insurgent 
element in the majority caucus to elect a senator, but these threats were never realized.  And as 
we will see, there were three instances when the majority party did not have a nominee until after 
balloting had already begun, in 1881, 1887, and 1911. 
The second most important thing to know about New York U.S. Senate elections during 
this period is that the actual canvass for the Senate tended to begin after the November election.  
Although Riker (1955) claimed that the pre-election “popular canvass” was common during this 
period, we can find no evidence of it in New York.   Although there were some instances where 
party leaders campaigned to elect “friendly” state legislators, the senatorial canvass was not the 
only consideration.  Until Thomas C. Platt consolidated his hold over the Republican Party 
machine in the 1890s, this does not appear to have been a common practice directed centrally.  
Competing party notables would sometimes support different local candidates.  It is clear that 
party leaders rarely had a good sense about where they stood in the upcoming U.S. senatorial 
contest until legislators started arriving for the January session in Albany, two months after the 
state election.7
As readily as we believe that parties structured the outcomes of Senate elections in state 
legislatures, there has never been micro-level analysis of the voting behavior of state legislators 
for the U.S. Senate during this period.  Did the majority party winning streak in New York rest 
on rock solid party loyalty among the foot soldiers, or did the majority party win by casting off 
                                                 
6 For this project, we have gathered the election results for all New York state legislative elections from 1871 to 
1920.  The aggregate figures show two things.  First, particularly during the 1870s and 1880s, there were long 
periods of time when Democrats won the aggregate vote totals in legislative races but still did not control the 
legislative chambers. Using the standard linear regression technique, we discover that the Republican bias in the 
state Senate during this period was 9.5%; in the House it was 7.7%.  The swing ratio was 2.2 in the Senate and 2.8 in 
the House. 
7 Schiller (2003) contains considerable evidence of the extent to which legislators abandon their campaign pledges 
to one Senate candidate when it became clear that candidate could not garner a majority in the Senate election in the 
legislature.  
 8
insurgents? How loyal were partisans in supporting their party’s nominee for Senate?  How were 
nominees chosen in the first place?  When the parties succeeded, what techniques did they 
employ and how successful were they?  New York is an excellent case study because we have 
party affiliation data for all the legislators and we can therefore add more substance to the 
conventional wisdom about party control over U.S. Senate elections during this time period. 
Table 2 provides a basic answer to the first question of how loyal New York state 
legislators were in supporting their parties’ nominees.  The table reports party loyalty on the first 
ballots in each chamber, for each election.  In this case, we have identified the caucus-sponsored 
nominee and recorded the fraction of partisans who voted for that candidate in each chamber, 
before the joint convention, if one was necessary.8  The one exception is the two special elections 
in 1881, responding to the dual resignations of Sens. Conkling and Platt, when the Republican 
Party leadership was unable to gain enough signatures to call a nominating caucus.  In the 1881 
elections, it is reasonable to suggest that Conkling was a prominent enough Republican Party 
boss that loyalty among Republicans can be measured by the fraction who voted to return him 
and Platt to the Senate.   
Despite general party cohesion in Senate election balloting, there were some important 
substantive exceptions to the power that party bosses wielded over the rank and file.  The most 
important exception was in the effort to respond to the joint resignations of Conkling and Platt in 
1881 over a patronage dispute with President Garfield.  The other major exception for the 
Republicans was 1887, when a three-way race that split the pro-machine faction spilled over into 
floor voting which had to be resolved in joint convention.  The final case was in 1911, when a 
group of reformers within the Democratic Party, led by upstate senator Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
battled the Tammany-dominated party machine for weeks.  We will discuss each of these cases 
in some detail below. 
                                                 
8 Formally, both parties’ “joint caucuses” met preceding the legislative balloting for Senate, to nominate the parties’ 
choices to fill the vacancy.  A strong distinction was made between a caucus of party members and a conference.  At 
a caucus, anyone in attendance was bound to abide by the majority vote of the caucus.  Anyone not in attendance 
was not bound.  Absences were noted by the leaders and by the press, which attended and reported the deliberations 
and the roll call vote(s) on the nomination.  Anyone who absented himself from the caucus without “good cause” 
was considered an insurgent or a bolter.  Because of the heavy implications of meeting in caucus, it was often 
difficult to call caucuses whenever joint convention balloting became protracted.  Therefore, party leaders would 
often call conferences, which were allowed to take votes on whether to support particular candidates, but without 
binding participants. 
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Noting that the party leaders were influential in guiding developments in senatorial 
elections is not the same thing as saying that legislative party members were regularly under the 
thumb of New York City party bosses in the choice of senators.  The truth is much more 
interesting than that.  In fact, a review of the choice of party candidates reveals the precarious 
position of party bosses in New York during this period.  To help guide the discussion, Table 3 
summarizes all major party nominations for Senate in New York from 1871 to 1911. Bosses like 
Roscoe Conkling, Thomas Platt, and Charles Murphy were always chief among the dramatis 
personae in each of these nomination fights.  However, in the middle years of this period, which 
witnessed instability at the top of both parties’ organizations, were as likely to unearth party 
divisions and boss failures, as they were to provide evidence of political organization strength. 
 
The election(s) of 1881:  Stalwarts and Half-Breeds 
The election of 1880 deeply divided the New York Republican Party, as it did the party 
nationwide.  Conkling became known as one of the leading “Stalwarts,” who were opposed to 
President Hayes’s policies of reconciling with the South and instituting civil service reform.  He 
had led the effort to bring Ulysses S. Grant out of retirement, nominating him for a third term, 
but in the end, Conkling and his followers lost at the national convention.  The deadlocked 1880 
Republican convention eventually nominated a dark horse, James Garfield, for president.  A 
moderate, Garfield was still identified as a “Half-Breed.”  To balance the ticket, the convention 
nominated Chester A. Arthur, a lieutenant of Conkling’s in New York politics, for Vice 
President. 
Garfield barely carried New York in the 1880 presidential election.  With this victory, 
Republicans also carried the statewide races and won a majority of votes cast for their state 
legislative candidates.  Republicans controlled the legislature, and thus it was assured that the 
incumbent Democratic Senator Kernan would be replaced with a Republican. 
The Half-Breed/Stalwart split infected the process of choosing the Republican nominee 
who was sure to be Kernan’s successor.  The canvass for the Republican nomination occupied an 
intense four day period preceding the January 13 Republican caucus (NYT 1/14/1881, p. 1; 
Brown and Smith 1922, pp. 254-55; Alexander 1909, pp. 464-65). The initial leading Republican 
candidates were both Stalwarts, Thomas C. Platt and Richard Crowley.  Crowley had been 
Speaker of the Assembly and had served widely in the federal and state governments in many 
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capacities.  Platt had also served in the House, but was by then the president of the United States 
Express Company.  Although both were Conkling allies, Half-Breeds believed that Platt would 
be easier to deal with.  In fact, Platt’s conciliatory nature would earn him the nickname “The 
Easy Boss,” in later years, as he came to dominate the New York Republican Party himself. 
Following a precedent from the 1869 senatorial election, House Speaker George H. 
Sharpe delayed making committee assignments, hoping to pressure House members to vote for 
Crowley.  This tactic backfired, and was one factor frequently mentioned in post mortems of 
Platt’s eventual victory.  However, the primary factor contributing to Platt securing the 
Republican nomination was a promise he made to a conference of Half-Breeds, that he would 
support Garfield’s appointments, even appointments that Conkling opposed (Brown and Smith 
1922, p. 255; Alexander 1909, p. 468; Gosnell 1924, p. 26).   
Platt won the Republican nomination comfortably, though this fact probably reflects 
Platt’s over-eagerness to please all elements of the Republican Party.  In any event, his desire to 
stand between the Half-Breeds and Conkling set up the next conflict, which resulted in one of the 
most dramatic showdowns in American political history. 
In brief, the conflict began when Garfield forwarded to the U.S. Senate the nomination of 
Judge William H. Robertson to be the collector of the port of New York, a prime patronage 
appointment.  Robertson had led the Half-Breed revolt within the New York delegation the 
previous year, and thus was Conkling’s greatest intra-state rival. Conkling “thoroughly detested” 
him (Gosnell 1924, p. 26).  Conkling fulminated over the nomination, publicly and within closed 
Republican caucuses in Washington, striking even his allies as being belligerent and childish.  
Platt suggested to Conkling that they both resign their seats in protest and then seek reelection, to 
demonstrate back-home support of Conkling’s position. 
That was a mistake.  The public response to Conkling’s histrionics over the Robertson 
nomination had been negative, and his decision to resign in protest only made matters worse with 
the public.  Conkling’s decision was attacked, even among Stalwarts, as childish and inimical to 
Republican Party unity.  Platt suffered, as well, in the court of public opinion and party councils.  
Not only was he seen as trying to wiggle out of his promise to support Garfield’s appointments, 
the public initially perceived the dual resignations as being Conkling’s idea, not Platt’s.  This 
consequently earned Platt the nickname of “Me Too.” 
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Conkling’s and Platt’s problems in the New York State Legislature began when 
legislative Half-Breeds, along with a small number of Stalwarts who were outraged at 
Conkling’s behavior, refused to enter into a caucus to choose Republican nominees for the newly 
opened seats (Alexander 1909, p. 479).  Conkling and Platt would have to press on with their 
efforts to regain their Senate seats without the endorsements of their party’s caucus.   
Balloting began on May 30.  The first ballots in the two chambers of the state legislature 
were not good.  In the House, Platt received only 20 and Conkling 25 of the 78 Republican votes 
cast on the first ballot.  In the Senate, Platt received 8 and Conkling 9 of 25 Republican first 
ballot votes.  At this point, the only ray of hope they had was the fact that the opposition had not 
rallied behind a single set of candidates.  For instance, on the first ballot in the House, 
Republicans voted for a total of 14 different candidates in opposition to Platt, and 17 candidates 
in opposition to Conkling.   
An ordeal that would consume seven weeks and four days had begun.  All told, there 
were 56 ballots taken to fill the Conkling seat and 48 ballots taken to fill the Platt seat.  
The Democrats themselves were in an interesting position.  On the one hand, speculation 
ran rampant that a deal would be done such that the Democrats would join with Conkling forces 
to ensure the election of Conkling and Platt, through a combination of cross-over votes and 
strategic abstentions.9  The maximum degree of flexibility for the Democrats was illustrated in 
the caucus that was called to name two Democrats to stand for election to Platt and Conkling’s 
vacant seats.  State Senator John Jacobs was nominated to receive Democratic votes in the race 
for Conkling’s “short seat” vacancy, while former Senator Francis Kernan was endorsed for 
Platt’s “long seat” vacancy.  However, when a motion was about to be made to make the caucus 
choice binding on all caucus participants, there was a disturbance in the hall, which allowed for a 
hasty adjournment motion to be made, which carried (NYT 5/31/1881, p. 1).  Thus, the 
Democrats had their nominees, but they were also free to try to get a better deal individually if 
they could find it. 
The position of the Democrats became even more interesting as balloting wore on.   Sen. 
Jacobs’s nomination for the short term violated a provision of the New York State constitution 
that explicitly prohibited incumbent state legislators from being elected to the United States 
                                                 
9 On the face of it, it seems unlikely that the Democrats would have agreed to take actions that would have ensured 
the election of Conkling and Platt.  Conkling’s Radical background and his role as the undisputed Republican Party 
boss made him anathema to the Democrats.  Nonetheless, the possibility at least was mentioned in the press.  
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Senate.  At the time of the caucus meeting, friends of Jacobs denied that this was a problem, 
since in the off chance that Jacobs actually was elected to the Senate, the U.S. Senate itself 
would be the judge of whether the New York constitutional provision would be enforced.  
However, this constitutional objection came back to haunt the Democrats, as Republican 
legislators began objecting to Jacobs receiving votes.  This led to threats by the Republican 
leadership that they would start treating votes cast for Jacobs as null and void.  If they did this, 
then Conkling could conceivably be declared elected, if he simply received a majority of the 
Republican votes cast.  When the Republican Governor Cornell intimated that he would 
acquiesce with such a ruling and sign a certificate of election, Democrats dropped Jacobs, 
substituting Clarkson Potter instead, on the 24th ballot on June 23. 
Balloting to replace Conkling and Platt dragged on, well into the summer heat.  No truly 
significant movements occurred until two dramatic turns affected the outcome of the race, after 
voting had lasted a month.  The first was when Platt was caught in the arms of a woman, not his 
wife, which led to his hasty withdrawal from the race on July 1.  A major portion of Platt’s votes 
were redistributed to Richard Crowley, but not all.  Platt’s withdrawal failed to rally either the 
Stalwart or Half-Breed forces around any single candidate, or manageable set of candidates, so 
balloting continued even more chaotically than before.   
One day later, President Garfield was assassinated.  The assassination, which hinged on 
the issue of patronage, drew national indignation toward anything having to do with patronage.  
Chauncey Depew,10 who had been the primary Republican vote getter against Platt, withdrew his 
name from consideration and worked to help bring together a conference of Republicans on July 
8.  At that meeting, they agreed to split the two seats, allowing the Half-Breeds to choose one 
nominee and the Stalwarts the other.  The agreement also stipulated that the first faction to come 
up with a nominee would be allowed to claim the long term.  The Half-Breeds managed to reach 
agreement first, choosing Warner Miller for the long (Platt) term; the Stalwarts chose Elbridge 
Lapham for the short (Conkling) term.  However, the former supporters of Conkling and Platt 
refused to enter into the agreement.  The balloting continued. 
The next significant break occurred on July 17, when Speaker Sharpe threw his support 
behind the two compromise candidates.  This quickly resulted in the election of Miller the next 
                                                 
10 Depew is known to political scientists mostly through Riker’s (1986) essay on Depew’s deft use of a killer 
amendment to delay passage of the 17th Amendment.  In 1880, New Yorkers knew Depew as a reform-oriented 
Republican who had only recently been a leader of the Liberal Republican movement. 
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day, on the 48th ballot.  However, diehard Conkling supporters continued to support him, 
making resolution of the short term more difficult.  Finally, on July 22, during a Republican 
conference meeting, Sen. Edwin Halbert, who was the most stalwart of the Stalwarts, declared 
the need to resolve the election and his willingness to go over to Lapham.  A vote was taken, 
Lapham was formally nominated, and he was formally elected in that evening’s joint ballot, the 
56th ballot of the affair. 
The immediate result of these machinations was the election of two middle-level party 
functionaries to the U.S. Senate.  The long-range result was more substantial for the history of 
party politics in New York.  Conkling retired to New York City, where he entered private law 
practice, stayed away from politics, and died seven years later.  Platt, on the other hand, beat a 
tactical retreat, and set about gaining control of New York Republican politics, in the wake of the 
vacuum left by Conkling’s retirement. 
 
The Republicans and their factions – the election of 1887 
The election of 1887 held special meaning to former Senator Platt, since it was his seat 
that had been taken away by the incumbent, Warren Miller. The Republicans controlled both 
chambers by a comfortable margin. Platt had tried earlier to assert control in the 1885 Senate 
election by pushing his favored candidate, Levi Morton, but the Republican caucus bucked him, 
choosing William Evarts instead.  To bolster his influence, Platt made sure to play an active role 
in the 1886 State legislative elections, especially in the upstate legislative districts, by helping 
candidates in marginal seats who were likely to support Morton in the Senate canvass.  When 
Republicans captured the legislature in 1886, Platt was confident that his candidate was a shoe-in 
(Alexander 1923, p. 84). 
Yet, once the legislature gathered in Albany in January 1887, the election was not so 
much assured.  Other Republicans coveted the seat.  Warner Miller was confident in his 
performance as the incumbent senator and viewed himself as the leading candidate to further 
anti-machine, reform politics.  Frank Hiscock was a conservative Republican who as 
congressman had been part of the Republican leadership under Thomas B. Reed.  He had a 
strong desire for the Senate seat and believed he could defeat Platt’s candidate for the vote of 
party regulars.  When the Republican caucus convened on Monday, January 17, it was revealed 
that Morton and Hiscock supporters had arranged a pact to defeat Miller (NYT 1/18/1887, p. 1).   
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The Republican caucus took two votes the first night.  The first ballot revealed that Smith had 44 
votes in the joint caucus, Morton had 35, and Hiscock 12.  A second ballot was called, which 
solidified the first.  The caucus adjourned without a choice. 
Platt and his lieutenants worked overnight to break the resolve of the Hiscock supporters, 
trying to get them to support Morton.  They failed.  On the ballots held in the separate chambers 
on Tuesday at noon, only one Republican who had voted for Hiscock in caucus, William 
Kimball, went over to the Morton camp. Lacking a Republican nominee, the two chambers gave 
pluralities to the Democratic nominee, Smith Weed.11   
A second Republican caucus was called Tuesday night, this time in an attempt to settle on 
a nominee for the next day’s joint convention.  Three ballots were held, and by the end, the 
Morton-Hiscock alliance could command only 47 votes, with 48 needed to make a nomination.  
Therefore, when the joint convention balloted on Wednesday, the conservative faction split in 
two, and the reformers were unable to rally a majority of Republicans.  Only three votes changed 
between the separate ballots and the joint convention, and all three deserted Hiscock in favor of 
Miller.12   
A third night of caucusing ensued, and this time the caucus stayed in session until a 
nominee was chosen. As the evening became day, Platt recognized that his candidate could not 
win; if he wanted to defeat Miller, he would have to thrown his weight behind Hiscock, which he 
eventually did (NYT 1/20/1887, p. 1).   The next day, with a unified Republican vote, Hiscock 
was elected to the Senate by a vote of 91 to 62. 
 
  1911:  The  Rise of the Reformers and Extended  Joint Session Balloting 
The most important contextual dynamic of the 1911 senatorial election, the last held 
before the institution of the popular election of senators, was the Progressive split within the 
                                                 
11 The actual vote in the House was Weed (41 votes), Miller (32), Morton (36), and Hiscock (10).  In the Senate, the 
vote stood Weed (11), Miller (10), Morton (9), and Hiscock (1).  
12 The vote in joint convention stood Weed (61 votes), Miller (43), Morton (33), Hiscock (11).  Weed actually 
picked up the most votes between the separate and the joint ballots, due to the appearance of several Democrats who 
had skipped the first round of voting.  Conversely, Morton suffered on the first joint ballot by the non-attendance of 
several legislators who had voted for him in the chambers separately. 
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Republican Party in the 1910 general election, which allowed Democrats to gain control of both 
legislative chambers.13
 On the Democratic side, the opportunity to elect a United States senator for the first time 
in nearly twenty years was hampered by a reform split of their own.  The New York City 
delegation, swollen under consolidation, controlled the Democratic caucus; therefore Tammany 
boss Charles Murphy was presumably in the driver’s seat.14  The Tammany candidate was 
William F. “Blue-Eyed Billy” Sheehan, who had previously served as Speaker of the Assembly 
and Lieutenant Governor, and now continued to be active in party politics (NYT 1/12/1911, p. 
1).  However, a sizeable contingent of upstate Democrats, led by Sen. Franklin Roosevelt and 
supported by Gov. John A. Dix, refused to go along.  The reformers supported Edward M. 
Shepard, who had run two unsuccessful campaigns for mayor of New York as a reform 
Democrat, first for mayor of Brooklyn before consolidation and later for mayor of the 
consolidated city.15
This break in the Democratic majority ranks gave rise to a three-month fight over the 
election, which was heavily covered by the New York press.16   Both sides tried to use media to 
marshal public opinion and mobilize constituencies between the end of the November election 
and the actual Senate election in January. The second public phase of the canvass began when 
Tammany boss Murphy arrived in Albany on January 11.  The next day, three days prior to the 
caucus meeting, the New York Times reported that it had taken a poll of state legislators on the 
senatorial election, and no one was willing to make a commitment (NYT 1/13/1911).17   
Murphy’s difficulties became apparent when he held a highly publicized audience with 
Governor Dix, who pointedly refused to take a position in the upcoming senatorial election.  The 
Democratic caucus, which met three days later, revealed the deeper extent of Murphy’s 
problems.  As predicted, 25 legislators, including state Sen. Franklin Roosevelt, stayed away 
from the caucus, thus signaling that they would not be bound by any decision the caucus made.  
                                                 
13 This is even though the Democrats easily beat the Republicans in the popular vote for both chambers.  
Malapportionment was such that although Democrats won about 60% of the two-party vote in the state legislative 
elections, they won only about 51% of the seats in the two chambers. 
14 From the subsequent events that unfolded, the extensive New York Times article on 31 Dec. 1910 (p. 3) that 
trumpeted “Murphy Controls Senate Election” through his iron grip on the entire party was overwrought. 
15 The first New York Times account of the race notes the endorsement of Shepard by a large number of upstate 
Democrats; the headline of the article noted that “Tammany men [are] silent.” (NYT 12/18/1910, p. 1. 
16 NYT 1/3/1911, p. 1; 1/7/1911, p. 5; 1/14/1911, p. 1; 1/15/1911, p. 2;  1/16/1911, p. 1; 1/18/1911, p. 1. 
17 Just two years before, the Times had conducted a poll of New York state legislators, preliminary to the election 
that chose Elihu Root, and everyone had responded with a preference. 
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In addition, of the 91 Democrats who did attend the caucus, only 62 voted for the machine 
candidate. Twenty-two supported Shepard and 7 favored D. Cady Herrick (NYT 1/17/1911, p. 
1).  This was a slap in the face for the Tammany and allied organizations, which had now 
demonstrated that they could only hold together a bare majority of their own party caucus.18
The Republican caucus was much more sedate, but even it evidenced some discord when 
Sen. J. Mayhew Wainwright nominated Theodore Roosevelt.  Roosevelt garnered only one other 
vote; Depew was nominated 58-2, with 17 absent (NYT 1/17/1911, p. 1).19  
The first ballot in the separate legislative sessions that began the formal election 
illustrated the influence of the party caucus.  On the first ballot in both chambers, all Democratic 
caucus members voted for Tammany’s Sheehan, even those who had opposed him in the party 
caucus (Table 4).  The absentees, on the other hand, split their votes, voting mostly for reformer 
Shepard.  Only one party regular usually allied with Tammany voted for Sheehan.  Figure 1 
summarizes the vote shares received by the major Democratic candidates during the various 
rounds of balloting.  The various factions periodically agreed to hold pro forma votes, at which 
time only a handful of ballots would be cast.  The graph in Figure 1 omits these ballots, showing 
instead only ballots in which a quorum voted. 
As balloting proceeded, Sheehan continued to draw a plurality of support, but never 
enough to garner a majority.  A handful of his initial supporters deserted after the earliest ballots, 
but instead of going over to Shepard, they scattered their votes for a variety of “safe” candidates.  
The purpose of this strategy was to signal a belief that Sheehan was unelectable, while at the 
same time demonstrating that the legislator was unwilling to go over to the insurgent faction 
(NYT 1/21/1911, p. 1; 1/22/1911, p. 1; 1/24/1911, p. 1).  Eventually Boss Murphy and Sheehan 
left Albany, as did most of the legislature, leaving a skeleton crew of legislators to cast pro 
forma ballots day in and day out.   
After five weeks of balloting, however, Shepard made the next move, by withdrawing 
from the race, confident that Sheehan would not be chosen, hoping that a compromise candidate 
                                                 
18 The New York Times report notes an attempt to exclude newspaper reporters from the caucus meeting, which, in 
the estimation of the reporter, would have been a first in New York history.  The report also noted that the resolution 
to exclude the reporters did not exclude the large number of party officials who were also in the chamber.  
Following a vociferous protest, the reporters were allowed to stay (NYT 1/17/1911, p. 1). 
19  The absence of such a large number of Republicans at the caucus meeting has gone un-analyzed in the historical 
literature.  Given the practice at the time, the most likely explanation is that this collection of Republicans desired to 
retain maximal flexibility in subsequent balloting, perhaps joining with insurgent Democrats to elect a bipartisan 
reform candidate.  Although such possibilities were raised in the coming weeks, they never were positively acted on. 
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would emerge who would be more in keeping with reformer desires.  Martin Littleton 
immediately jumped into the race, picking up support of the reformers who had previously 
supported Shepard, plus some erstwhile caucus loyalists who had fallen away from Shepard 
(NYT 2/27/1911, pp. 1-2). 
Littleton quickly hit a glass ceiling of support, however, which led to a month of fruitless 
efforts to hold a second caucus to arrive at a compromise (NYT 3/6/1911, p. 1).  By the third 
week of March, Murphy had apparently decided to ease Sheehan out.  The effort was on to find a 
suitable replacement who could attract enough insurgents to win (NYT 3/20/1911, p. 1; 
3/23/1911, p. 1).  Eventually the reformers expressed a willingness to enter into a second party 
caucus, even though when the caucus was actually held, most were no-shows (3/25/1911, p. 1; 
3/26/1911, p. 1; 3/26/1911, p. 10). 
The maneuvering toward the end game came in this second party caucus.  When Sheehan 
refused to step aside, the new caucus refused to endorse him again, giving him 28 votes out of 90 
cast.  Only four of the original reformers entered the second caucus meeting.  However, the 
regular Tammany forces remained divided, so Democrats were still unable to choose a senator 
(NYT 3/28/1911, p. 1).  Using Senate President Robert Wagner as an intermediary, a group of 
reformers submitted a list of acceptable candidates, suggesting that if one from the list was not 
chosen, they would enter into an agreement with the Republicans to elect a senator instead (NYT 
3/30/1911, p. 1). 
Murphy had other ideas, however.  His supporters countered with James O’Gorman, a 
“safe” justice of the state Supreme Court (NYT 4/1/1911).  Surprisingly, the reformers swung 
into line, allowing O’Gorman to be elected on a strict party line vote.  In the end, although the 
reform leaders tried to salvage the situation, the general verdict seemed to be that Murphy had 
out-maneuvered them (NYT 4/1/1911). 
The final resolution to the contest occurred through the confluence of three exogenous 
events.  The first was the approach of the April 4 date for the convening of the United States 
Senate.  Few in New York desired for the state to be short a senator when it convened (NYT 
3/24/1911, p. 10).  The second was Gov. Dix’s increasing impatience with the protracted 
senatorial voting, which ground legislation to a halt, hindering his chances of pursuing the 
reform agenda that had gotten him elected.  Dix was simply unwilling to continue drawing the 
wrath of Tammany leaders on an issue that did not directly affect his programmatic plans.  The 
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third was a fire in the state capitol on the eve of the final caucus, which destroyed the state 
library, caused $5 million in damage, and rendered the House legislative chamber unusable.  
Immediately upon the election of O’Gorman, both chambers adjourned for two weeks, allowing 
repairs to be made to the capitol.  
*      *      * 
The New York case illustrates several aspects of the dynamics of state legislative 
elections for U.S. Senate.  First of all, the size of the majority party mattered, but merely 
securing a numerical advantage in the state legislature did not assure smooth sailing in the choice 
for U.S. senator.  The public canvass, so far as we can tell, did not have any binding or real effect 
on the cohesion of majority parties around candidates in Senate elections.  In New York at least, 
the electoral connection in state legislative elections was weak in determining the specific 
winning candidate in U.S. Senate elections. The real contest frequently occurred in the party 
caucus that met prior to the beginning of official voting for senator, and in some cases, held its 
own repeated balloting to choose a nominee.  Individual party bosses and prominent elected 
officials did control some aspects of the Senate election process, but they were constantly 
challenging each other, and could suffer when they overstepped their state level base of support.   
 
The Case of Florida 
 In stark contrast to New York State, which had most of its battles over U.S. senator in 
party caucuses, Florida had a history of extended joint session balloting, both in times of close 
party division, and in times of super-majority control of both chambers. Given its recent history 
as a pivotal state in the 2000 Presidential election, it should come as no surprise that Florida was 
a state plagued by conflictual U.S. Senate elections.  Of the 14 elections studied in this data set, 5 
elections were thrown to joint convention, and each election required at least 21 ballots to decide 
the winner (range 21-30).  Below is a brief description of 4 of these multiple joint ballot elections 
(1873, 1875, 1887, and 1891).  
 
Florida 1873   
 The election of 1873 resulted in sending S.B. Conover, the Republican Speaker of the 
Florida Assembly, to the United States Senate by a vote of 43-21-5-2-1-1.  The Florida 
Assembly was controlled by the Republicans by a margin of 28-26, and the State Senate was 
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controlled by Republicans by a margin of 13-11.  Notably, only 2 senators (8%) and 11 (21%) 
House members voted for Conover on the first ballot, and only one (4%) senator and 10 (19%) 
House members voted for him on the first joint session ballot.  The incumbent senator was 
Thomas Osborn (Republican), and he did not seek reelection.20  Figure 1 shows the ebb and flow 
of the number of joint ballot candidates in joint legislative session during this election.21  
The amount of vote shifting among legislators was also an important element of Senate 
elections in state legislatures.  If factions were united, then we would expect coalitions, even 
small ones, to persist as voting proceeded.  Instead, we find that legislators constantly shifted 
their votes from one candidate to another, and even in and out of coalitions during the joint 
session period.  There is little evidence from this set of elections that legislators were under the 
control of any specific party boss or faction leader.  There was a great deal of vote shifting across 
the joint ballots, especially among Republican members of the legislature.   Table 5 shows the 
percent of the members of the chamber and the frequency with which they shifted their votes 
during joint session balloting.  
The behavior of the two parties differed in that the Democrats (in the slim minority in the 
Assembly and Senate) rallied behind several different candidates in an attempt to defeat the 
Republicans.  In the Assembly, a majority of Democratic members voted for a single candidate 
who was not Conover on the first eight joint session ballots, but on the ninth joint session ballot, 
they start to defect to Conover.  On the other hand, the Republicans did not rally behind a single 
candidate; in fact, for the first 16 ballots, Republicans split their votes across a greater number of 
candidates than their Democratic colleagues did.  Conover, the eventual winner, began to amass 
support among Democrats on the ninth joint session ballot before he amassed the same support 
among Republicans.  In fact, he lost the Democrats to another candidate who did not emerge 
until the 13th ballot (Westcott); at the same time, Conover faced a strong push by another 
Republican, Bisbee, who stayed in the race as a strong competitor until the very last ballot.  On 
that ballot, Conover managed to eke out his victory with support from both Democrats and 
Republicans.   Among senators, the Democrats for the most part stayed united behind a single 
                                                 
20 Though Osborn did receive an early scattering of support in the early joint session balloting from 
legislators in the House and Senate.  
21 In the Assembly, the number of candidates receiving votes ranged from 4-14, with an average of 7 
candidates per joint session ballot (s.d.=2); in the Senate there was an average of 8 candidates receiving 
votes (s.d.=2).   
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candidate (which switched as the balloting progressed), with some support for one other minor 
candidate, while the Republicans split their votes across an average of six candidates.  Senate 
Democrats did not begin to defect to Conover until the 19th ballot.  
 The specifics of the 1873 election of U.S. senator in Florida illustrate our findings in 
earlier work that the slimmer the majority party’s control of the chamber, the more likely it is 
that the Senate election will be conflictual (Schiller and Stewart 2002).  In this case balloting was 
extended because of the permeability of support across party lines.  This was a Reconstruction 
southern legislature, after all, and party labels themselves were in flux. 
 
Florida 1875  
 The election of 1875 sent Charles Jones (Democrat) to the U.S. Senate by a final vote of 
41-29-2-1-1-1.  For the election of 1875, it is harder to draw conclusions about partisan cohesion, 
because information about party identification is only available for about half of the members of 
the legislature.  From what we can tell, the Democrats were still more cohesive around one or 
two candidates than the Republicans were, and the same set of legislators shifted their support 
over the course of balloting as a bloc to different candidates whom they thought could garner a 
majority. Like 1873, very few legislators voted for the eventual winner on the first ballot (0 in 
the Senate, 1 in the House).   
 As balloting proceeded, there appeared to be a downward trend in the number of  
candidates being considered, as Figure 3 illustrates.  However, on the 16th ballot, both parties 
disbanded their coalitions and entered a free-for-all.  The parties regrouped on the 18th ballot, 
with the Democrats beginning to rally around the eventual winner, Charles Jones, while the 
Republicans rallied around Bisbee, who had been a viable candidate in the 1873 race.  Still, it 
was not until the 24th (and last) ballot that Jones becomes the preferred candidate of a majority 
of the Democrats and wins a majority of all senators.   
As in the case of the 1873 election, there was a great deal of vote shifting within the 
parties during joint session balloting within the parties, which again indicates the high degree of 
coalitional instability within the majority party.  (See Table 6.)   In terms of intra-party coalition 
shifting, in the Senate, the Democrats shifted their support to two main candidates on the 11th 
ballot (Wilkinson Call and D.S. Walker) and then again, on the 19th ballot, they abandoned Call 
and Walker in favor of Bullock.  The Republicans were disjointed until they rallied around 
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Bisbee, also on the 19th ballot, but he eventually became the runner-up to Jones on the 24th, and 
final, ballot.  
  The 1875 Senate election in Florida is an illustration of the inability of parties to marshal 
a majority of their rank and file behind a single candidate for the U.S. Senate.  The Democrats 
were only slightly better at coalescing around a single candidate for several ballots, but that 
coalition was not stable, and shifted as a bloc to several different candidates, none of whom was 
capable of getting a majority vote.  The Republicans were not united for the early rounds of 
balloting, but soon recognized that they might swing the election if they rallied behind one 
candidate that might appeal to some renegade Democrats.   
 
Florida 1887 
 In the U.S. Senate election of 1887, Samuel Pasco was eventually elected by a vote of 84-
17.  It took 25 ballots to secure Pasco’s election, even though the Democrats held a super-
majority in each chamber22 and Pasco was the Speaker of the Florida Assembly. 
The contest began as a two-way race between a former governor, W.D. Bloxham, and the 
incumbent governor, E.A. Perry.  There were some other minor candidates but the bulk of the 
votes were split between these two men (See Figure 4). In the joint convention balloting, Speaker 
Pasco did not receive a single vote until the third ballot, and thereafter never received more than 
five votes (16%) until the very last ballot.  Because he was that chamber’s presiding officer, it is 
not surprising that Pasco had more support in the Assembly.  Pasco’s support peaked in the early 
rounds of joint voting, at 16 members (23%), and declined thereafter until the last ballot. 
Competition from the Republicans was minimal.  The few Republicans in the chamber 
voted for Goodrich, and the rest of the legislature split their votes across several other 
Democrats.  
Parallel with the legislature’s joint meetings to ballot for senator, the Democratic caucus 
met continually, from early April to mid-May, where it balloted a total of 89 times.  The 
Democrats split their support between Bloxham and Perry relatively evenly on each party caucus 
ballot; the eventual winner, Pasco, did not receive any votes in the party caucus. It was not until 
                                                 
22 Democrats held a 26-5 advantage in the Senate and 59-14 advantage in the House, for an overall advantage of 85-
19 in the joint convention. 
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the 89th ballot, held on May 19, that the party finally rallied around Pasco as a compromise 
choice.23   
Again, as in the prior elections, there was considerable vote shifting by legislators 
throughout the joint session balloting process (Table 7).  However, unlike the previous cases we 
have explored for Florida, the amount of shifting was reduced considerably, as coalitions tended 
to shift in larger blocs, less frequently than before.  The important thing to note here is that it 
appears that by 1887, factions were slightly more stable than they had been in earlier elections, 
but they still managed to significantly divide the majority party.  
The Republicans, even though few in number, stayed steady in their support of Goodrich, 
but the Democrats spread their votes across a number of candidates, with Bloxham and Perry the 
front runners.  However, even their coalitions were not that stable, and neither candidate was 
capable of garnering a majority in joint session.   
The larger question left unanswered here is why Pasco was not the front runner to begin 
with, and why he could not get a majority faction to cohere around his candidacy far earlier in 
the balloting process. The 1887 election illustrates how precarious the control of “party leaders” 
was over their rank and file.  Bloxham, Perry and Pasco were major political forces in the Florida 
Democratic Party, yet they could not get control of a single Senate election in the state 
legislature.     
 
Florida 1891 
 Of all Florida Senate elections that went to extended joint balloting, the election of 1891 
was the most contentious, and is most illustrative of the kind of factionalism that plagued super-
majority parties in state legislatures, particularly in the South.  Wilkinson Call was a two-term 
senator, having been elected with little competition in 1879 and 1885, who headed a strong 
faction of the Florida Democratic Party.  The other faction was headed by the Democratic 
Governor, Francis Fleming, who had a number of allies in the state legislature.  The extent of 
party in-fighting in this election drew the repeated attention of the national press, as reflected by 
                                                 
23 Tribune Almanac, 1888, p. 34. One element of this election that differs from the prior election is 
that the range of the number of candidates across ballots is the same – in each chamber, there 
was an average of 6 candidates per ballot (s.d.=1.5).    
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this forecast by the New York Times in April 1891, entitled “Florida’s Next Senator – Mr. Call in 
the Race with Many Competitors:”  
 
The Legislature is made up of thirty-two Senators and sixty-eight Representatives. Of 
these ninety-nine are Democrats, Senator Smith of St. Johns County being the only 
Republican. Call is particularly strong in the country districts of the State, and the 
sparsely-settled and agriculture sections of the State are, of course, in the majority as far 
as representation in the Legislature is concerned.  The legislative canvass in November 
last was prosecuted almost solely upon the Call and anti-Call issue.  In almost every 
instance it became necessary, in order to secure a nomination to either branch, for the 
candidate to declare his position on the Senatorial question, and in this way, as soon as 
the election was over, the complexion of it was pretty well understood. Senator Call’s 
friends claim 67 votes, but a more conservative estimate places his strength at about 55 or 
56. If the caucus plan is pursued a general caucus of the Democratic members of both 
branches will number 99. If strict Democratic precedent is followed the two-thirds rule 
will prevail, and it will therefore require a vote of 66 in caucus to secure the nomination. 
 
Until quite recently the members of the opposition to Call have given a scattered support 
to at least a half-dozen aspirants.  Among these were John F. Dunn, of Marion County, 
who is known throughout the State as “the Phosphate King,” he having within the past 
year and a half made several millions of dollars in the sale of phosphate lands; W.D. 
Bloxham, the present State Controller, who was at one time Governor; E.M. Hammond, 
the present State Senator from Orange County; Charles Dougherty of Volusia County, a 
member of the present Legislature and ex-member of Congress from the Second District; 
J.P. Taliaferro, the present Chairman of the Democratic State Executive Committee, and 
the Governor of the State, Francis P. Fleming.   At a recent conference of the Call 
opposition, it was practically decided that the anti-Call votes should be centered upon 
Senator Dunn, and that no dark horses should be brought into the fight to embarrass 
Dunn’s chances or to help Call.  
 
It is generally agreed throughout the State that Dunn made a deal some months ago with 
Robert F. Rogers, President of the Farmer’s Alliance, by which Rogers was to work in 
Dunn’s interstate and exert his influence among Alliance men toward centering their 
strength upon Dunn.  Rogers is very close to Chipley, who is the inside leader of the Call 
opposition, and as Chipley’s policy is “anything to beat Call,” he is prepared to enter into 
almost any sort of a deal whereby his purpose may be accomplished.  (New York Times, 
April 7, 1891, pg. 1)  
 
At the beginning of the balloting, Call received about the same relative support in each 
chamber.  In the separate chamber votes that preceded the joint convention, Call received the 
votes of seven senators (23%) and 14 members of the Assembly.  On the next day, in joint 
convention, Call garnered support from 15 senators (53%), but only 25 members of the 
Assembly (39%).  
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Therefore, the New York Times could not have been more inaccurate in their predictions. 
As it turns out, none of the supposed challengers was able to amass sufficient support to defeat 
Call, and only two of those mentioned in the Times article (Dunn and Hammond) even received 
more than a few votes.  The main challenger to Call turned out to be J.G. Speer, and he was the 
only other candidate to receive enough votes in the party caucus to deny Call the nomination.   
In fact, throughout most of the party caucus balloting that occurred in parallel with the 
joint convention meetings, the race pitted Call against Speer one-on-one.  Unable to choose a 
candidate within the caucus, the Democrats voted to disband it and did not send a nomination to 
the full legislature.24    
The most notable thing about this long course of balloting is that Call was unable to 
garner the Democratic nomination only because he was unable to amass 2/3 of the vote in 
caucus.  He had a majority.  The members of the caucus voted early on to spread their votes 
around in the joint convention, among several candidates, in order to prevent a candidate who 
did not have the caucus endorsement from winning.  Consequently, the vote for Call and Speer in 
the joint convention balloting did not reflect their support within the caucus. 
However, it is also not clear from the actual joint convention balloting that the members 
of the caucus stuck to this agreement entirely.  It appears that the anti-Call faction tried to cohere 
around a small number of candidates from the 7th ballot to the 17th, but failing to get a majority, 
members of the faction became splintered again.   
In the end, Call was elected only because anti-Call members of the legislature refused to 
vote, leaving Call to receive almost all the votes in a joint convention session that barely 
contained a majority of the two chambers combined.  (On the last ballot, the anti-Call members 
of the Assembly and Senate refused to vote, to the point where only 54% of the Assembly voted 
(all but one for Call) and 49% of the Senate voted (all for Call).) 
The pre-election Times article overestimated the degree of unity within both factions.  
Call did not have the kind of strong support that the article suggested, or at the very least, it was 
soft support.  The anti-Call forces were only united by their opposition to Call, but there were 
enough major players in that faction that legislators were not asked to be loyal to one candidate 
in particular.  There was no single anti-Call leader who was popular enough to attract widespread 
support or to organize support around a single opposition candidate.  
                                                 
24 Tribune Almanac, 1892, p. 69.  
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In terms of vote shifting, the Call supporters stayed relatively loyal, but again, there were 
not enough of them to give him an easy early victory.  The anti-Call members shifted their votes 
quite a bit in search of a viable opponent, and they account for most of the outer tail of the vote 
shifts described in Table 8. 
Call’s political nemesis, Governor Fleming, used the absence of a real quorum to suggest 
that the election was invalid.  In a last ditch effort to prevent Call from returning to the Senate, 
Governor Fleming refused to acknowledge Call’s victory, and appointed another man to Call’s 
Senate seat.  As the New York Times described it in a November 18th article,  
The Senate of the United States, when it meets next month, will have to decide upon the 
title to a seat in that body of two claimants from the State of Florida, one elected by the 
Legislature on the 26th of May last, and the other appointed  by the Governor on the 22nd 
of September….After the re-election of Senator Wilkinson Call in May, Governor 
Fleming refused to certify the election on the ground that it was not valid. When he 
appointed R.H.M. Davidson in September to the alleged vacancy, Secretary of State 
Crawford refused to attach the seal of the State to the certificate on the ground that the 
appointment was not valid, there being no vacancy when it was made.  A mandamus was 
granted by the Supreme Court of the State requiring him to affix the seal to the 
Governor’s certificate of appointment, and yesterday he complied with the mandate of 
the court rather than suffer the penalty for contempt. 
 
As both claimants for the seat are Democrats, and as the majority of the Senate is 
Republican, this case ought surely to be decided upon its merits, without partisan or 
factional bias, and it ought to settle once for all the questions that have been raised, which 
are of considerable interest….  
 
There is no dispute about the facts in connection with the election of Mr. Call. On the 
ballot for Senator,…Mr. Call received… a majority of all the members of both houses.  
[Gov Fleming argued that since a quorum of each house was not present, then a joint 
assembly without a quorum from each chamber cannot elect a senator]  
 
The Florida case is clearly a faction contest in which a majority of the Legislature and the 
Secretary of State were on one side and the Governor and the Supreme Court of the State 
were on the other side….The Senate will have to decide between them, and it will be 
surprising if it does not make short work of the claim of Gov. Fleming’s Senator. 25
 
As in the case of New York, conflict between two prominent state officials pervaded the 
U.S. Senate contest. The U.S. Senate did seat Call, and he served out his term until 1897, when 
Stephen Mallory was elected senator in another extended election (25 joint session ballots).  In 
                                                 
25 New York Times – “The Florida Senatorship” Nov 18, 1891 pg 4.   
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that case, Mallory beat the legislative leader of the anti-Call faction, W.D. Chipley.  One 
interesting epilogue is that J.P. Taliaferro, a potential opponent to Call in 1891 and a state party 
leader, was elected to the Senate in 1899 by beating Samuel Pasco.  
 The history of Senate elections in Florida reveals a great deal about the actual control 
that party organizations had over the Senate election process in state legislatures.  As witnessed 
by the public nature of the 1891 Senate race, certainly state legislative elections were influenced 
by the prospect of choosing a U.S. senator, but even when state legislators ran on tickets or 
platforms specifically stating their preference for senator, it was no guarantee that such promises 
would hold once balloting began.  Party control of chambers certainly meant a senator from that 
party would be elected, but not because a party’s members could be counted on to rally behind 
the same nominee from the start.  Conventional beliefs that Senate elections in state legislatures 
were “done deals” or “dominated by individual party bosses” need to be reexamined and 
challenged in an effort to better understand the intensity of conflict that surrounded these choices 
in the late 19th century. 
 
Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have used two states as case studies, as a first step towards challenging 
our conventional understanding of the dynamics of U.S. Senate elections in state legislatures 
prior to the adoption of the 17th Amendment.  In the 1870s and early 1880s in New York,  
relatively strong party unity contained factionalism within the majority party; in Florida, weak 
parties (and an artificially extinguished Republican Party) led to greater fluidity in the creation of 
voting coalitions. 
But by the late 1880’s the caucuses began to cohere a bit more, as evidenced by the 
reduction in the number of majority party Senate candidates considered in caucuses and on the 
floor.  However, it is important to point out that the cohesiveness appears to have been because 
of shared norms, not because of threats of retaliation by strong bosses.  Party bosses had weak 
blandishments over their followers.  As the repeated failures of Platt show, leaders often had to 
chase after their followers just to shore up their base, much less triumph over a rival faction.  The 
perception that machine or party leaders had tight control over the Senate election process is 
misguided and inaccurate.  Party leaders certainly expressed a public opinion as to who should 
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be elected senator, and in private, bartered with the rank and file to get “their guy” into the 
Senate, but they were not in a position to demand loyalty, they had to ask for it.  
In contrast to the oft-cited mention by Riker of the public canvass, we find little evidence of a 
strong connection between state legislative election promises, and subsequent voting on the state 
House and Senate floors.  In both states, the senatorial canvass tended to start after the state 
legislative elections – in other words, candidates for the U.S. Senate made their strongest push 
for votes after the legislature convened, and they each knew that no prior pledge was cast in 
stone.    
Another important caveat for students of political history is the degree to which newspaper 
articles overestimated the influence of specific party players in determining the outcome of 
Senate elections in legislatures.  In particular, it is important to remember that the New York 
Times tended to support reform Republicans, and its news accounts tended to reflect that 
perspective.  As we saw in the case of Florida, the Times’s confident predictions about the Call 
race of 1891 fell largely flat, because the reporter relied too heavily on expectation of coherence 
within majority party factions.  Although we have come to accept as fact that newspapers had a 
partisan bent to them in the late 19th century, it may also be that the conventional wisdom of that 
time led to overblown estimates of party leaders’ influence over their rank and file in the 
selection of U.S. senators. 
Of course, these conclusions are based on tentative explorations of two states.  There are 
forty-six states to go.  As these two cases show, Senate elections varied considerably across even 
two states.  Because Senate elections brought together all the critical elements of national politics 
from the Civil War to the Age of Reform, a broader exploration of Senate elections will also give 
us new insights into the development of American politics more generally. 
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Figure 1.  Vote share of major Democratic candidates, 1911 New York Senate election. 
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Figure 2.  Number of candidates receiving votes for U.S. senator in Florida, 1873, by ballot. 
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Figure 3.  Number of candidates receiving votes for U.S. senator in Florida, 1875, by ballot. 
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Figure 4.  Number of candidates receiving votes for U.S. senator in Florida, 1887, by ballot. 
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Figure 5.  Number of candidates receiving votes for U.S. senator in Florida, 1891, by ballot. 
 
Florida Senate Election 1891 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31
Joint Ballot Number 
N
um
be
r 
of
 S
en
at
e 
C
an
di
da
te
s 
Joint Legislature 
 
 
 35
Table 1.  Joint convention ballots in sampled states, 1871-1913. 
 
State 
Total number of elections, 
1871-1913 
Years of joint 
convention ballots Number of ballots 
Alabama 20 1872a 3 
  1876 1 
  1890 2 
California 15 1873 11 
  1895 3 
  1899 103 
Florida 14 1873 21 
  1875 24 
  1887 25 
  1891 30 
  1897 25 
Iowa 17 None --- 
Kansas 16 1874 5 
  1877 16 
  1879 3 
Kentucky 16 1876 11 
  1878 11 
  1884 19 
  1890 4 
  1896 51 (no election) 
  1897 60 
  1908 29 
Maine 15 None --- 
Massachusetts 16 1875 2 
  1877 5 
  1883 1 
  1887 1 
  1889 3 
  1899 1 
  1911 1 
Minnesota 15 1883 28 
New York 16 1875 1 
  1881 56 (Conkling vacancy) 
48 (Platt vacancy) 
  1887 2 
  1891 1 
  1911 63 
North Carolina 15 1903 8 
 
aIn 1872, two bodies met claiming to be the Alabama state legislature.  One body, controlled by 
Democrats, took three ballots in joint convention to elect Francis Sykes.  The other body, 
controlled by Republicans, elected George Spencer without entering into a joint convention. 
 
Sources:  Tribune Almanac, various years; state legislative journals, various years.
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Table 2.  Party loyalty amoung House and Senate members on first ballots, 1873-1911 
 
 House Senate 
Year Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. 
1873 96% 
(27) 
100% 
(91) 
100% 
(5) 
91% 
(22) 
1875 100% 
(68) 
98% 
(53) 
92% 
(13) 
100% 
(17) 
1879 100% 
(20) 
98% 
(96) 
100% 
(12) 
100% 
(19) 
1881 98% 
(45) 
98% 
(80) 
100% 
(6) 
100% 
(25) 
1881 
(Conkling) 
100% 
(47) 
32% 
(78) 
86% 
(7) 
36% 
(25) 
1881 
(Platt) 
100% 
(47) 
26% 
(78) 
100% 
(7) 
32% 
(25) 
1885 100% 
(51) 
99% 
(74) 
100% 
(12) 
100% 
(19) 
1887 100% 
(41) 
47% 
(68) 
100% 
(11) 
50% 
(20) 
1891 100% 
(64) 
100% 
(57) 
100% 
(13) 
100% 
(19) 
1893 100% 
(71) 
100% 
(52) 
100% 
(15) 
92% 
(13) 
1897 91% 
(34) 
100% 
(110) 
85% 
(13) 
100% 
(35) 
1899 100% 
(58) 
99% 
(84) 
100% 
(23) 
100% 
(26) 
1903 100% 
(56) 
100% 
(85) 
90% 
(21) 
82% 
(28) 
1905 100% 
(44) 
100% 
(99) 
100% 
(12) 
100% 
(35) 
1909 97% 
(31) 
100% 
(89) 
100% 
(14) 
100% 
(35) 
1911 76% 
(87) 
100% 
(59) 
83% 
(30) 
100% 
(20) 
 
Note:  Entries in italics indicate years when the election went to joint convention.  Loyalty is 
measured as the percentage of party members who vote for the caucus nominee.  The exception 
is the two 1881 special elections, when the Republican caucus failed to meet.  In 1881 
Republican loyalty is measured by the percentage of Republicans show supported Conkling and 
Platt, respectively. 
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Table 3.  Party candidate nomination dynamics.  (All nominations in joint caucuses.  Bold entries 
indicate eventual winners in the Senate election.) 
 
Year Democrats Republicans 
1873 Charles Wheaton nominated with 24 
votes, to 11 for Henry R. Selden.  
Liberal Republicans caucus with 
Democrats 
Roscoe Conkling unanimously 
nominated to succeed himself. 
Liberal Republicans bolt. 
1875 Francis Kernan:  nominated with 
77 votes, to Henry C. Murphy (9) 
and John T. Hoffman. 
Edwin Morgan:  No information 
1879 Lt. gov. William Dorsheimer: no 
information 
Conkling unanimously re-
nominated 
1881 Francis Kernan  re-nominated by 
acclamation 
Thomas C. Platt nominated with 55 
votes, to 26 for Crowley, 10 for 
Rogers, 10 for William A. Wheeler, 
and 5 scattering. 
1881 
(Platt) 
Francis Kernan:  nominated with 34 
votes, to Clarkston Potter (7), R.W. 
Peckham (5), Erastus Corning (3), 
and Horatio Seymour (1) 
Republican caucus not convened 
1881 
(Conkling) 
Sen. John Jacobs:  nominated with 
39 votes to A.S. Hewitt (8), Horatio 
Seymour (4), and Charles N. Potter 
(1).  Question raised whether Jacobs 
should be nominated, since state 
constitution precluded current 
legislators from being elected.  He 
withdrew, under threat of the 
Republican leadership to treat all 
votes for him as null and void.  
Clarkson Potter substituted by 
caucus. 
Republican caucus not convened 
1885 Edward Cooper (former mayor of 
NYC).  No information. 
William Evarts  nominated with 61 
votes, to Levi Morton (28) and 
Depew (3) 
1887 Smith Weed nominated with 42 
votes, to Edward Cooper (3), 
Scattering (4). 
Frank Hiscock nominated, with 50 
votes, to 43 for Sen. Miller and 0 for 
Levi Morton, on 18th ballot.  Morton 
had been primary opponent of Miller 
until the end  
1891 Gov. David Hill  nominated by 
acclamation 
William Evarts re-nominated by 
acclamation 
1893 Edward Murphy nominated with 
85 votes, to 5 for Cochran. 
Frank Hiscock:  no information 
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1897 David Hill re-nominated with 5 
negative votes in caucus and 5 other 
bolters. 
Thomas Platt nominated with 142 
votes, to 7 for Joseph H. Choate. 
1899 Murphy unanimously re-nominated. Chauncey Depew nominated 
unanimously after vigorous canvass 
and support by Platt. 
1903 John B. Stanchfield:  chosen by 
party leaders in December; 
nominated unanimously. 
Thomas Platt re-nominated with 1 
dissenting vote for Elihu Root. 
1905 Smith M. Weed nominated with 42 
votes, to 14 for D Cady Herrick. 
Chauncey Depew re-nominated 
unanimously 
1909 Ex-lt. gov. Lewis Canler:  no 
information 
Elihu Root nominated unanimously. 
TR lobbied for his Secy. of State. 
1911 William F Sheehan, nominated with 
62 votes, 22 for Edward Shepard and 
7 for D Cady Herrick.  However, 25 
(loyal to Shepard) bolted the caucus.  
After long deadlock, Judge James 
O’Gorman nominated on 63 votes, 
with 23 for Sheehan and 15 
scattering votes among 6 others.  
O’Gorman supported by Tammany. 
Depew re-nominated with 2 votes 
cast for TR. 
 
Sources:  Alexander 1909; 1923, New York Times articles, various years.
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Table 4.  Democratic caucus vote for senator vs. first ballot vote for senator, 1911. 
 
a.  House  
 Vote on first ballot 
Caucus 
vote: 
A.B. 
Parker 
D. Cady 
Herrick 
E.M. 
Shepard 
Martin 
Littleton 
William F. 
Sheehan Total 
Absent 6 1 12 1 1 21 
Herrick 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Sheehan 0 0 0 0 46 46 
Shepard 0 0 0 0 14 14 
Total 6 1 12 1 66 86 
       
b.  Senate  
 Vote on first ballot 
Caucus 
vote: 
D. Cady 
Herrick 
Edward 
M. 
Shepard 
James W. 
Gerard 
Martin L. 
Littleton 
William F. 
Sheehan Total 
Absent 1 2 1 1 0 5 
Herrick 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Sheehan 0 0 0 0 16 16 
Shepard 0 0 0 0 7 7 
Total 1 2 1 1 25 30 
 
Source:  New York House and Senate Journals; New York Times 1/17/1911, p. 1 
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Table 5.  Frequency of vote shifting in the 1873 Florida Senate election (21 joint convention 
ballots). 
 
 % of chamber 
Frequency of 
vote shifting 
Senate 
(N=24) 
House 
(N=53) 
0  0% 
1 4%  
2 8% 9% 
3 13% 2% 
4   
5   
6  8% 
7 8% 11% 
8 17% 13% 
9 17% 11% 
10 13% 8% 
11 4% 13% 
12 4% 9% 
13 4% 8% 
14 4% 2% 
15  2% 
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Table 6.  Frequency of vote shifting in the 1875 Florida Senate election (24 joint convention 
ballots). 
 
 % of chamber 
Frequency of 
vote shifting 
Senate 
(N=24) 
House 
(N=53) 
0   
1   
2   
3 4% 4% 
4  2% 
5  6% 
6 8.5% 2% 
7 8.5% 8% 
8 8.5% 10% 
9 13% 11% 
10 21% 10% 
11 8.5% 17% 
12 12% 8% 
13 8.5% 19% 
14 4% 2% 
15   
16 4% 2% 
17   
18   
19  2% 
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Table 7.  Frequency of vote shifting in the 1887 Florida Senate election (25 joint convention 
ballots). 
 
 % of chamber 
Frequency of 
vote shifting 
Senate 
(N=32) 
House 
(N=71) 
0  14% 
1 3% 3% 
2 16% 11% 
3 7% 23% 
4 16% 18% 
5 16% 6% 
6 19% 8% 
7  6% 
8 7% 3% 
9 7%  
10 3% 3% 
11  3% 
12 3%  
13 7% 3% 
14   
15   
16   
17  1% 
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Table 8.  Frequency of vote shifting in the 1891 Florida Senate election (30 joint convention 
ballots). 
 
 % of chamber 
Frequency of 
vote shifting 
Senate 
(N=32) 
House 
(N=65) 
0 28% 5% 
1 4% 1% 
2 4% 11% 
3  12% 
4 6% 20% 
5 16% 5% 
6 10% 5% 
7 6% 16% 
8 6% 3% 
9 6% 5% 
10 6% 3% 
11  2% 
12  3% 
13 4%  
14  2% 
15  2% 
16 4%  
17  3% 
18   
19   
20   
21  2% 
 
